Post by Funkytown on Jun 16, 2020 14:22:45 GMT -6
How effective has Bob Quinn’s draft approach been? by Chris Burke
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Link:
theathletic.com/1831337/2020/05/26/how-effective-has-bob-quinns-draft-approach-been/
Every so often, I’ll crowdsource story ideas, just to get a feel for where attention is focused when it comes to the Lions. The request I’ve received more than any other: A look back at Bob Quinn’s draft classes as Lions GM (2016-present), an attempt to put into context how well (or poorly) he’s done in those spots since arriving in Detroit.
It’s not an easy subject to quantify. For starters, his latest classes — really, any of those put together since Matt Patricia arrived in 2018 — are still in their nascent days. Is anyone ready to pass a final verdict on Frank Ragnow or Tracy Walker or those ’18 picks? Probably not, although we’re at least far enough out with that group to start poking around on production.
Beyond that, how does one measure a draft class against another? Straight-up production? Team success with those players on board? The proverbial eye test?
One method is Pro Football Reference’s “Approximate Value” (AV) metric, which is similar in nature to the well-known WAR (Wins Above Replacement) number in other sports. In hopes of getting some feel for Quinn’s efforts in 2018 and especially 2017 and ’16, I’ve compared each of his picks those years to the average annual AV for players taken in those same slots over the past decade. So, for example, Taylor Decker — the Lions’ first-round pick in 2016 — is measured against everyone else taken No. 16 overall from 2010-19.
In fairness to both the GM and his players, I’ve left off 2019 and ’20 from this exercise. There isn’t nearly enough data available yet on last year’s class and, obviously, this year’s class hasn’t even practiced together yet. Any sort of judgment would be premature.
But, hopefully, this helps put into focus the Lions’ 2016-18 classes — where Quinn hit, where he missed, what the fallout has been on all fronts. We begin with Quinn’s first draft:
2016
Much the same way Matt Patricia’s late hire tightened the screws on 2018 draft prep, Bob Quinn had to work on a shortened schedule in 2016. The Lions hired Quinn in mid-January, meaning what’s usually a year-long process was reduced — for him — down to a third of that. He would’ve been scouting the draft class anyway for the Patriots, and the Lions had several holdovers in their front office from one coaching regime to the next, but it all had to come together quickly.
Given the circumstances, Quinn laid a decent foundation.
It’s not an easy subject to quantify. For starters, his latest classes — really, any of those put together since Matt Patricia arrived in 2018 — are still in their nascent days. Is anyone ready to pass a final verdict on Frank Ragnow or Tracy Walker or those ’18 picks? Probably not, although we’re at least far enough out with that group to start poking around on production.
Beyond that, how does one measure a draft class against another? Straight-up production? Team success with those players on board? The proverbial eye test?
One method is Pro Football Reference’s “Approximate Value” (AV) metric, which is similar in nature to the well-known WAR (Wins Above Replacement) number in other sports. In hopes of getting some feel for Quinn’s efforts in 2018 and especially 2017 and ’16, I’ve compared each of his picks those years to the average annual AV for players taken in those same slots over the past decade. So, for example, Taylor Decker — the Lions’ first-round pick in 2016 — is measured against everyone else taken No. 16 overall from 2010-19.
In fairness to both the GM and his players, I’ve left off 2019 and ’20 from this exercise. There isn’t nearly enough data available yet on last year’s class and, obviously, this year’s class hasn’t even practiced together yet. Any sort of judgment would be premature.
But, hopefully, this helps put into focus the Lions’ 2016-18 classes — where Quinn hit, where he missed, what the fallout has been on all fronts. We begin with Quinn’s first draft:
2016
Much the same way Matt Patricia’s late hire tightened the screws on 2018 draft prep, Bob Quinn had to work on a shortened schedule in 2016. The Lions hired Quinn in mid-January, meaning what’s usually a year-long process was reduced — for him — down to a third of that. He would’ve been scouting the draft class anyway for the Patriots, and the Lions had several holdovers in their front office from one coaching regime to the next, but it all had to come together quickly.
Given the circumstances, Quinn laid a decent foundation.
2017
That Approximate Value metric isn’t a bible. It provides a way to simplify players’ careers and compare them through eras, but it can’t really take into account much outside the statistics. So when, say, Jarrad Davis posts a strong AV score relative to his draft position, the goal is to put that outcome into some sort of context. He’s been fairly productive as a defender who plays a high percentage of snaps and accumulates tackles.
To grade out the ’17 class, though, we have to consider the overall impact here. Davis hasn’t elevated his game much beyond where it was when he arrived and the Lions’ second-round pick, Teez Tabor, is one of Quinn’s worst misses. Even with Kenny Golladay and Jamal Agnew dragging this class back above water, the return on investment is uneven.
That Approximate Value metric isn’t a bible. It provides a way to simplify players’ careers and compare them through eras, but it can’t really take into account much outside the statistics. So when, say, Jarrad Davis posts a strong AV score relative to his draft position, the goal is to put that outcome into some sort of context. He’s been fairly productive as a defender who plays a high percentage of snaps and accumulates tackles.
To grade out the ’17 class, though, we have to consider the overall impact here. Davis hasn’t elevated his game much beyond where it was when he arrived and the Lions’ second-round pick, Teez Tabor, is one of Quinn’s worst misses. Even with Kenny Golladay and Jamal Agnew dragging this class back above water, the return on investment is uneven.
2018
Again, it’s still early in the process for this group. Things could change quite a bit as early as this season, if Frank Ragnow ascends to Pro Bowl levels or Da’Shawn Hand stays healthy or — flip side — Kerryon Johnson falls out of the game plan after D’Andre Swift’s arrival.
However, given that the Lions had just six picks in ’18 and didn’t take their first swing until No. 20, Quinn had a worthwhile three days. At least 66 percent of this class (Ragnow, Johnson, Tracy Walker, Hand) figures to play significant roles this season.
Again, it’s still early in the process for this group. Things could change quite a bit as early as this season, if Frank Ragnow ascends to Pro Bowl levels or Da’Shawn Hand stays healthy or — flip side — Kerryon Johnson falls out of the game plan after D’Andre Swift’s arrival.
However, given that the Lions had just six picks in ’18 and didn’t take their first swing until No. 20, Quinn had a worthwhile three days. At least 66 percent of this class (Ragnow, Johnson, Tracy Walker, Hand) figures to play significant roles this season.
A couple of reactions, with all of that on the table:
1) Those first three Quinn classes aren’t on track to go down as all-timers, but put together they probably deserve at least a passing grade. Here’s the rub, though: Where are the high-impact picks, the real franchise-changing additions? Golladay could hit that level — he’s on a very promising trajectory — or maybe one of the 2018 guys takes a leap. But even in spots where Quinn discovered decent contributors, he hasn’t uncovered many of those picks that have fellow GMs second-guessing themselves down the line.
Decker’s career has surpassed a decent chunk of the other ’16 first-rounders; Davis, for all his faults, still has turned in a better effort than several players taken around him in ’17. Did those picks push Detroit closer to the league’s best teams? What about Robinson or Glasgow or Agnew or Hand? Quinn shouldn’t take criticism for any of those picks, but eventually the Lions need to find those top-end talents.
Some of this has to do with where they were picking in 2016-18, down in the 16-21 range. Elite players can be had there, to be sure, but they arrive with less regularity than they do in the top five or top 10. Which is why, ultimately, Quinn’s and Patricia’s fates will rest as much on the T.J. Hockenson-led 2019 class and the Jeff Okudah-led ’20 class. Each of those players, specifically, need to be among the NFL’s best at their positions to start erasing any lingering talent gap from the Lions to those above them.
2) Patience in judging draft classes is always wise because — and NFL teams will tell you this — the goal isn’t just to find immediate-impact players, it’s to draft prospects who can contribute into their second and third contracts. The Lions just let Glasgow walk; they let Robinson walk; they might boot Davis after this season and Decker’s future is up in the air. Aside from Golladay, how many of the 2016 or ’17 draft picks are still going to be around when (if) Detroit gets this thing to where it needs to be?
In that context, I’m not entirely sure how to score a pick like Glasgow or even Robinson. Quinn had the foresight to find those players beyond Round 1 who were starter quality and, down the road, drew heavy interest from other teams. Those are draft wins, rather unquestionably in Glasgow’s case.
What does Detroit have to show for it now?
All things considered, Quinn has done a commendable job at the draft, maybe better than that, if the 2019 and ’20 classes pan out as the Lions hope. He’s also still searching for the big, positive swing in franchise fortune from these groups. Those aren’t mutually exclusive statements, and Detroit’s recent draft history shows it.
1) Those first three Quinn classes aren’t on track to go down as all-timers, but put together they probably deserve at least a passing grade. Here’s the rub, though: Where are the high-impact picks, the real franchise-changing additions? Golladay could hit that level — he’s on a very promising trajectory — or maybe one of the 2018 guys takes a leap. But even in spots where Quinn discovered decent contributors, he hasn’t uncovered many of those picks that have fellow GMs second-guessing themselves down the line.
Decker’s career has surpassed a decent chunk of the other ’16 first-rounders; Davis, for all his faults, still has turned in a better effort than several players taken around him in ’17. Did those picks push Detroit closer to the league’s best teams? What about Robinson or Glasgow or Agnew or Hand? Quinn shouldn’t take criticism for any of those picks, but eventually the Lions need to find those top-end talents.
Some of this has to do with where they were picking in 2016-18, down in the 16-21 range. Elite players can be had there, to be sure, but they arrive with less regularity than they do in the top five or top 10. Which is why, ultimately, Quinn’s and Patricia’s fates will rest as much on the T.J. Hockenson-led 2019 class and the Jeff Okudah-led ’20 class. Each of those players, specifically, need to be among the NFL’s best at their positions to start erasing any lingering talent gap from the Lions to those above them.
2) Patience in judging draft classes is always wise because — and NFL teams will tell you this — the goal isn’t just to find immediate-impact players, it’s to draft prospects who can contribute into their second and third contracts. The Lions just let Glasgow walk; they let Robinson walk; they might boot Davis after this season and Decker’s future is up in the air. Aside from Golladay, how many of the 2016 or ’17 draft picks are still going to be around when (if) Detroit gets this thing to where it needs to be?
In that context, I’m not entirely sure how to score a pick like Glasgow or even Robinson. Quinn had the foresight to find those players beyond Round 1 who were starter quality and, down the road, drew heavy interest from other teams. Those are draft wins, rather unquestionably in Glasgow’s case.
What does Detroit have to show for it now?
All things considered, Quinn has done a commendable job at the draft, maybe better than that, if the 2019 and ’20 classes pan out as the Lions hope. He’s also still searching for the big, positive swing in franchise fortune from these groups. Those aren’t mutually exclusive statements, and Detroit’s recent draft history shows it.
Link:
theathletic.com/1831337/2020/05/26/how-effective-has-bob-quinns-draft-approach-been/
